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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
substantial damages when there is proof of an injury over
and above the breach of a technical legal right and it only
imposes a penalty on the bank where such penalty is de-
served, i. e. where the bank acts maliciously or fraudu-
lently. This rule has been adopted by statute in several
jurisdictions, among which are Alabama, North Carolina
and Pennsylvania. 3
VALIDITY, INTERPRETATION, AND PROBATE
OF FOREIGN WILLS
Rabe v. McAllister'
Testatrix executed her first will while living in Balti-
more in 1927, leaving all her property to H. The same
year, she went to Germany, where in 1933 she made a
holographic will leaving all her property, except a church
bequest, to R. In 1935, in Germany, she made a third
will, also holographic, which consisted of an express revo-
cation of the 1933 will, and a direction that her heirs should
keep the family vault in Germany in order. After tes-
tatrix's death in Germany, in 1937, the first will was ad-
mitted to probate in Baltimore on December 1st, 1937,
and defendant was appointed administrator c. t. a. on re-
nunciation of the executrix. Meanwhile, the two other
wills had been probated in Germany, and copies were filed
in Baltimore on August 25th, 1938. On November 20th
this petition was filed by plaintiff heir-at-law, praying that
probate of the first will be revoked, with the letters there-
on to the defendant; that the third (1935) will be declared
operative, and that letters thereon be granted plaintiff's
attorney. Assets consisted of $4000 in Germany and $25,
000 in a Baltimore bank. Held: Petition dismissed. The
Court's decision was based on the theory of revival of the
first will by the revocation of the second, with no revoca-
tory conflict between the first and third wills.
The case contains a concise but thorough review of
Maryland law on the methods of revocation of wills, and
189 C. J. S. 365, note 45.18 A. (2d) 922 (Md. 1939).
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reaffirms the Colvin v. Warford2 doctrine as to the revival
of a revoked will by revocation of the intervening revok-
ing instrument.
Interest in the decision, however, may be greater be-
cause it contains one more application of Article 93, Sec-
tion 344,' dealing with the validity, interpretation, and
probate of foreign wills. This statute breaks up into
clauses as follows:
Clause 1. "Every will or other testamentary in-
strument executed without this State in the mode pre-
scribed by law, either of the place where executed or
of the law of the testator's domicil, or according to
the forms required by the law of this State shall be
deemed to be legally executed, and shall be of the
same force and effect as if executed in the mode pre-
scribed by the law of this State, provided, said will
and testament is in writing and subscribed by the tes-
tator; . .
Clause 2. "... and if the testator was originally
domiciled in Maryland, although at the time of mak-
ing the will, or at the time of his death he may be
domiciled elsewhere, said last will or testamentary
instrument so executed shall be admitted to probate
in any orphans court of this State; . . ."
Clause 3. ". . and when so admitted shall be
governed by and construed and interpreted according
to the laws of Maryland, without regard to the lex
domicilii, unless the testator shall expressly declare
a contrary intention in said will or testamentary in-
strument."4
2 20 Md. 357 (1863). This doctrine is summarized, at 20 Md. 393, in
these words: "That the cancellation of a revoking will, prima facie, is
evidence of intention to revive the previous will, is true, but it is ob-
vious that the presumption of that intention from the mere act of can-
cellation may be strengthened, qualified or rebutted altogether, by evi-
dence of the attending circumstances and probable motives of the tes-
tator." In Colvin v. Warford the second and inconsistent will was de-
stroyed; in the principal case, of course, the second and inconsistent
will was revoked expressly by a third will, which was not inconsistent
with the first will.
Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 344.
Each clause of the section has been made a separate paragraph for
ease in referring back to it. Of course, in the statute the clauses follow
each other in a single paragraph.
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The applicability of the statute in the instant case was
clear, as it was in other earlier cases; 5 but the wording
of the statute leaves for speculation several questions as
to its effect on the validity, interpretation and probate of
foreign wills in this state.
The first clause validates all foreign wills executed ac-
cording to the laws of (1) the testator's last domicil, or
(2) the place where executed, or (3) this State. This has
expanded the common-law rules of validity, which re-
quired of wills of personalty conformance with the law
of the testator's last domicil, and of wills of realty con-
formance with the law of the situs of the land affected.'
Its effect in the principal case validated the third will (as
also the second, which the third revoked) which would
have been ineffective if drawn in Maryland. The clause
seems first to have been applied in Olivet v. Whitworth,7
where a holographic Swiss will was held to be a valid ex-
ercise of a power of appointment over Maryland-located
personalty. Next, in Lindsay v. Wilson,' a holographic
French will by a testator domiciled in France at death was
held an effective transfer of Maryland realty; the Court
expressly pointed out how Section 344 had changed the
common-law rule of validity as to wills of realty. The
validity clause has been applied in later cases in the same
vein.9 The effect of this clause seems to raise few
problems.1"
5 Olivet v. Whitworth, 82 Md. 258, 33 A. 723 (1896) ; Lindsay v. Wilson,
103 Md. 252, 63 A. 566. 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 408 (1906); Johns Hopkins
University v. Uhrig. 145 Md. 114, 125 A. 606 (1924); Hunter v. Baker,
154 Md. 307, 141 A. 368 (1927).
As to wills of personalty see: RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec.
306, and Ibid., MD. ANNOT. (1936) particularly Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203,
28 Am. Rep. 448 (1877) ; 57 A. L. R. 229, 230. As to wills of realty, see:
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 249; Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md.
252, 268, 63 A. 566, 2 L. B. A. (N. S.) 408 (1906), and cases cited; 57
A. L. R. 229, 230.
782 Md. 258, 276, 33 A. 723 (1896). Although the Inference is that the
testatrix died domiciled In Switzerland, in which event the will would
have been valid at common-law in this state, the Court relied entirely
on the validating effect of Section 344, first clause.
8 103 Md. 252, 268, 63 A. 566, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 408 (1906).
9 See also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Uhrig, 145 Md. 114, 125 A. 606 (1924):
Hunter v. Baker, 154 Md. 307, 141 A. 368 (1928). In De Garmendia's
Estate, 146 Md. 47, 51-52, 125 A. 897 (1924) the court held a foreign holo-
graphic will invalid in the absence of proof that a use of the testa-
tor's name in the text fulfilled the German requirement of such wills
that they be "unterschriebene" by the testator.
10 One possible problem as to the effect of the validating first clause of
Section 344 is discussed infra n. 18. Note also that the clause only applies
to wills executed outside of Maryland.
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When we approach the problem of interpretation, we
find that here again Section 344 has changed the com-
mon law. Prior to the enactment of the second and third
clauses, wills of personalty were generally said to be in-
terpreted and given effect according to the law of the tes-
tator's last domicil, but the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws emphasizes that it is the domicil at date of execu-
tion which controls interpretation." Wills of land were
usually given effect according to the law of the situs of
the land, and were assumed to be interpreted and con-
strued according to the same law.12 Again, the Restate-
ment has emphasized the importance of considering the
domicil at date of execution of the will for interpreting
doubtful words. 3 By the above section of the Maryland
statute, wills of personal or real estate of a testator who
was "originally domiciled" in Maryland will be "governed
by, and construed and interpreted according to the laws
of Maryland" unless the testator expresses a contrary in-
tention.
In Olivet v. Whitworth no problem of interpretation
seems to have arisen, and there was apparently no need
for an application of Section 344 in this respect. 4  Two
cases have applied the interpretation provision. In Lind-
say v. Wilson the will admitted under Section 344 was in
French, by a Maryland-born testator dying domiciled in
France. The problem was the effect to be given the words
"biens" and "legataire universelle", whose literal trans-
lations were "goods" and "universal legatee" respectively,
but whose connotations in French legal circles included
the idea of realty, and a recipient thereof, as well as per-
sonalty and a recipient thereof. The Maryland court cited
Section 344 in its entirety, and held that this section did
not require that the words be given a meaning different
from that which they conveyed in French legal usage,
hence that they should include a devise of realty.
In Johns Hopkins University v. Uhrig,15 the testator,
born and raised in Maryland, died domiciled in California,
leaving a will under which the university was to receive
11 See RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcT OF LAWS, Sec. 308, and Ibid.; MD. ANNOT.;
57 A. L. R. 233.
"1 See RESTATEMENT, supra n. 11, Secs. 214, 251; 57 A. L. R. 229, 233,
79 A. L. R. 96, 103.
13 See RESTATEMENT, supra n. 11, Sec. 251.
"See supra n. 7. The second and third clauses of Section 344 had been
enacted two years before the decision in the Olivet case (Md. Laws 1894,
Ch. 151) and were not directly adverted to in that opinion.
15145 Md. 114, 125 A, 606 (1924),
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all the testator's securities, after intervening life estates,
to establish a chair in eugenics. Under California law,
the bequest was partially invalid by virtue of a statute
limiting charitable bequests to 1/3 of the testator's prop-
erty, where he died leaving heirs. Assets consisted of
$4300 in California, and $15,700 in Maryland. Probate oc-
curred in the former state, and copies were filed in Mary-
land.1" The Maryland Court held that this filing was
equivalent to an original probate under Section 344; that,
under that section, Maryland law was to be used in giv-
ing effect to the will; and, hence, that the California stat-
ute was inapplicable, at least insofar as Maryland per-
sonalty was involved. Summarizing case authority on the
provision of Section 344 as to interpretation, then, we
find one negative and one positive application of its terms,
the latter holding that it will operate on the will of a non-
resident "original domiciled" in Maryland, if that will
has been probated at the state of domicil and a copy of
probate filed under Article 93, Section 364. The principal
case (Rabe v. McAllister) adds nothing to this.
As to the effect of Section 344 on the probate of foreign
wills, most problems will arise as a result of what the
statute did not say. In Lindsay v. Wilson, original pro-
bate was had of the will of a testator dying domiciled in
France. The Court pointed out 17 that, as to testators not
"originally domiciled" in Maryland, no provision for pro-
bate was made thereunder. It was suggested that pro-
bate at the domicil and filing a copy of domiciliary pro-
bate under Article 93, Section 364 would provide the solu-
tion.1 7-a But suppose that probate cannot be had, for lack
of formal validity, elsewhere. If the testator was not
originally domiciled in Maryland, Section 344 does not pro-
vide for probate, and Section 364 cannot be invoked, since
there is no foreign probate to file thereunder. Suppose,
for example, two situations: (1) T, who has lived in
state A all his life, draws a will meeting the formal re-
"e Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 364. This section provides that any
person who may be interested in any devise or bequest of property with-
in or brought into this state may obtain a copy of the will and a cer-
tificate of the probate thereof in any other state or a foreign country and
present it to the Register of Wills of any county within this state; there-
after, a copy of such record is evidence of title to property disposed
thereunder, "with the same force and effect as if the original will had
been admitted to probate in this state."
17 103 Md. 252, 269, 63 A. 566, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 408 (1906).
17a Johns Hopkins University v. Ubrig, 145 Md. 114, 125 A. 606 (1924)
discussed 8upra, circa n. 15.
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quirements of Maryland, but not of state A; (2) T, a resi-
dent of state A who had never been domiciled in Mary-
land, executes his will in state B, in compliance with the
formal requirements of state B, but not with the internal
rules of Maryland or of state A where he died domiciled.'"
The question would essentially be: Can original pro-
bate be had for the wills of non-residents apart from Sec-
tion 344? Aside from statutory provisions, the better view
would seem to allow original probate in a state other than
that of the last domicil. 9 Maryland statutes referring to
administration and probate generally permit probate
wherever administration might have been allowed, had
the deceased died intestate;20 and administration may be
taken: (1) at the county of residence of the decedent;
(2) the county where he died, if he had no residence with-
in the state; or (3) the county wherein lies a considerable
portion of his personal property, if death and residence
were both outside the state.2 Section 344, it may be
argued, by its affirmative provision for probate of foreign
wills where the testator was "originally domiciled" in this
state, might be said to negative the power originally to
probate the wills of persons who never lived in Maryland.
It would seem, though, that this clause allowing probate
is to be read as an adjunct to the clause stipulating that
Maryland law shall govern the wills of persons originally
"The will in this second hypothetical situation would have to be vali-
dated by the first clause of Section 344, inasmuch as it would be invalid
by Maryland common-law principles. Here the question may be posed
as to whether this clause was intended to apply only to the wills of
persons "originally domiciled" in Maryland. On the history and phras-
ing of the section as a whole, it would seem that the validating clause
should operate on any foreign will, regardless of whether its author
ever lived in Maryland. Whether the Court of Appeals has endorsed
this view depends on the answer to another question: What does the
phrase "originally domiciled" mean as used in this section? If it means
that testator's domicil of origin must have been Maryland, Olivet v.
Whitworth, supra n. 7, is authority to the effect that the first clause of
the section does not depend on a domicil of origin in this state; there
the will of a testatrix born English was validated under the first clause.
However, if the phrase means "domiciled at any time" in Maryland,
there has apparently been no case in which the first clause has been
applied to a foreign will by a testator never domiciled in Maryland.
"o A full and interesting discussion of the question of original probate
of foreign wills in a state other than that of the domicil is found in 119
A. L. R. 491; see also RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, Sees. 467, 469.
" Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 351.
21 Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 14. From this rather ambiguous sec-
tion, it appears that at least there must be property of some sort with-
in the state before probate of any will will be allowed. As to whether
personal property within the state is a requisite, no opinion is ventured.
See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, MD. ANNOT. (1936) Sees. 467, 469.
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domiciled in the State, and that no intention to prevent
original probate of the wills of these not falling within its
confines is evidenced. Again, it might be argued that Sec-
tion 364 of Article 93, in providing for filing certified copies
of the probate of out-of-state wills in Maryland Orphans'
Courts, implies that this is the only means by which a
foreign will can be given effect here, outside of Section
344.22 This would not be a necessary, and probably not
a sound, conclusion.
It would seem better to recognize that the general pro-
bate provisions referred to above23 are available to admit
probate of foreign wills not specifically covered by Sec-
tion 344.24 There would be less uncertainty as to this, of
course, in the first illustration above, where the will satis-
fies the Maryland common-law requirements of validity.
As to the second illustration, it might not be too great a
strain on the rules of construction to allow the will to
be validated under the first clause of Section 344,21 although
its probate would not be under this section but would have
to be under the general probate sections. 6 Some legis-
lative or judicial clarification of the statutes would seem
desirable, if not necessary.
2This argument has been advanced in other states having statutes
closely similar to Art. 93, Sec. 364, with varying success. See cases dis-
cussed in 119 A. L. R. 491, 506.
21 Supra, circa footnotes 20, 21.
21 Space does not permit discussion of possibly applicable dicta and
analogies. However, see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, MD. ANNOT.
(1936), Sec. 469, particularly Harding v. Schapiro, 120 Md. 541. 547, 87
A. 951 (1913), and Brafman v. Brafman, 144 Md. 413, 414, 125 A. 161
(1924). Consider also Kurtz v..Stinger, 169 Md. 554, 182 A. 456 (1936).
25 See supra, n. 18.
21 Supra circa footnotes 19, 20, 21.
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